This paper is concerned with confidentiality of vertical information sharing in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer in the upstream and two or more retailers in the downstream engaging in a Bertrand competition. Each retailer has some private information about the uncertain demand and may choose to disclose it to the manufacturer with or with out a confidentiality agreement. We consider three information scenarios with varying degrees of confidentiality and show that a higher degree of confidentiality makes the manufacturer worse off, the retailers better off, and the whole supply chain better off. Furthermore, although retailers have no incentive to publicly disclose their information, both retailers and the manufacturer will have incentives to sign agreements and engage in confidential information sharing when the retailer competition is sufficiently intense. When information is shared confidentially, the retailers will infer the shared information from the manufacturer's wholesale price, and this signaling effect makes the manufacturer's demand more price elastic and results in a lower equilibrium wholesale price. When all retailers share their information confidentially, the manufacturer's price coordinates the supply chain in the sense that the equilibrium outcome of the supply chain is Pareto optimal. We also show that confidentiality of information sharing does not affect the inventory cost if the manufacturer has an option of making to stock. Furthermore, a higher intensity of retailer competition increases the variability of demand in the upstream market while information sharing reduces it.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with incentives for vertical information sharing in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer in the upstream and two or more retailers in the downstream. The retailers engage in a Bertrand competition in a differentiated end market where demand is uncertain. Each retailer has some private information about the demand and may choose to share/reveal it to the manufacturer. We refer to information sharing here as being vertical since it is between a retailer and the manufacturer, in contrast to the existing literature where information sharing is often assumed to be horizontal, i.e., between oligopolists in the same level of a supply chain.
Many industries today are making efforts to improve the profitability of their supply chains. One key initiative often mentioned is information sharing. Numerous studies show that information sharing between a manufacturer and a retailer improves the performance of the supply chain. Few of these studies, however, consider the strategic responses from other firms in the same market. In particular, empirical evidences show that one of the greatest obstacles to supply chain information sharing is the issue of confidentiality (Lee and Whang 2000) . One may think that it is a legal issue but it is an economic issue as well. For example, in the presence of other competing retailers, sharing information confidentially from a retailer to the manufacturer may hurt the manufacturer, and the manufacturer may find it beneficial to disseminate the information to other retailers. It is therefore important to examine the economic value of confidentiality to the parties involved in an information exchange.
The issue is particularly interesting in a supply chain setting because information disclosed to the manufacturer can be "leaked" to other retailers in two different ways. First, the manufacturer discloses the received information intentionally, a violation of confidentiality. Second, information could be "leaked" due to other retailers' rational expectations of the manufacturer's action. For example, after the manufacturer determines a wholesale price, presumably based on the shared information, other retailers, though not observing the transmitted signal directly, can infer it from the quoted wholesale price and will respond to the new information. The two manners of information leakage could have very different economic consequences. Confidentiality agreements, or nondisclosure agreements, prevent information leakage via direct disclosure to other parties but often allow the recipient to use the information in its business decisions (for instance, for the manufacturer to set the wholesale price) and thereby reveal the information indirectly 1 . In essence, confidentiality in vertical information sharing creates a situation of information asymmetry in which the downstream firms have less information and may take the wholesale price as a signal for information. A key question is: what is the efficient information allocation in an oligopolistic supply chain, if there is one? In this paper, we shall examine the issue in the context of aforementioned two level supply chain.
One frequently mentioned benefit for supply chain information sharing is that it reduces inventory related costs. It is well known that information is a substitute for inventory by reducing demand variability. From a decision theoretical viewpoint, more information results in a smaller demand variability, and the firm always benefits from such a change by having a lower inventory cost (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1988) . However, in a supply chain setting, the demand of an upstream firm (e.g., a manufacturer) is determined by the behavior of the downstream firms (e.g., retailers) who are often competitors. In the presence of such competition, information sharing between a manufacturer and a retailer may reduce the manufacturer's uncertainty, but it has other effects. For example, knowing that the manufacturer receives some information from a retailer, other retailers may respond to the fact by changing their strategies, and it is not at all clear that such reaction always decreases the demand variability faced by the manufacturer. Therefore, it is important and interesting to reexamines the relationship between information and inventory in the presence of competition. We shall do so by allowing the manufacturer an option of making to stock in our model.
Following the authors' previous work (Li 2002 and Zhang 2002), we use a three-stage game. In the first stage, and before any private information is available, each retailer commits to share information with or without a confidentiality agreement or to keep it private, and the manufacturer commits whether to sign the agreement and receive the information. In the second stage, after retailers have received their private information and the signals have been sent (truthfully, it is assumed), the manufacturer sets a wholesale price (and an initial production quantity if the make-to-stock option is allowed). In the third stage, competition in the end market follows in a Bayesian fashion with incomplete information.
While the main thrust of our previous work is sound, there is a subtle error. In analyzing the thirdstage subgame, we incorrectly assumed that information leakage due to rational expectations on the wholesale price occurs as if the same information were disclosed directly to other retailers. What we should have done, and we do it now, is to explicitly examine how retailers extract information from the wholesale price and how such behavior affects the firms' incentives for information sharing and confidentiality.
We will consider four disclosure scenarios. We refer to a retailer who chooses to reveal his demand signal as a participating retailer.
(S0) Disclosure to retailers only. A participating retailer transmits his signal to a depository that is accessible to all retailers but not to the manufacturer.
(S1) Disclosure to the manufacturer and all retailers. A participating retailer transmits his signal to a depository that is accessible to the manufacturer and all retailers.
(S2) Disclosure to the manufacturer and all participating retailers. A participating retailer transmits his signal to a depository that is accessible to the manufacturer and all participating retailers, but not to any of the nonparticipating retailers.
(S3) Disclosure to manufacturer only. A participating retailer transmits his signal to a depository that is accessible to the manufacturer but not to any of the retailers.
Scenario 0 is essentially horizontal information sharing between oligopolists with a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure -all retailers, participating or not, have access to the information. There are many papers along this line including Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982) , Clarke (1983) , Vives (1984), Gal-Or (1985 , Li (1985) , Shapiro (1986), and Raith (1996) , etc. In a stereotypical model, an oligopoly of firms produce either a homogeneous product or differentiated products, facing a linear demand function with a common but a priori unknown intercept. Before deciding its output quantity or selling price, each individual firm privately observes a noisy signal of the true value of the intercept.
Each firm must decide whether to report its own signal to an information club before observing it. It is well know that no retailer will reveal its private information if the competition is in quantity but all retailers will do so if the competition is in price. Scenarios 1 to 3 describe varying degrees of confidentiality of information sharing.
In Scenario 1, information sharing is the most open, or the least confidential. This is a case of nonexclusionary disclosure -the manufacturer and all retailers, participating or not, have access to the shared information. This is essentially what drives the results in Li (2002) and Zhang (2002). They show that no retailer will reveal its demand information, regardless of the nature of competition. Scenario 3 captures the confidentiality nature of vertical information sharing and is the focus of this paper. Vertical information sharing with confidentiality effectively creates an information asymmetry in which the manufacturer possesses more information and her wholesale price aggregates the shared information. Since retailers do not observe the shared information directly, they will infer it from the wholesale price which is observable. From the viewpoint of retailers, in Scenario 3, the wholesale price is not only a marginal cost, as in Scenario 0 or 1, but also a signal they can use to form their expectations of demand and other firms' strategies. Scenario 2 has an intermediate degree of confidentiality, in between Scenario 1 and 3. This is a case of exclusionary disclosure where the manufacturer and only participating retailers have direct access to the shared information.
We solve the three-stage game for each scenario. We first examine the incentives for information sharing in each scenario, i.e., with a fixed degree of confidentiality. In Scenario 1, the manufacturer is always better off as more retailers disclose their information but each retailer is always worse off by disclosing his information. Therefore, retailers will not publicly disclose his information in any circumstance. In Scenario 3, there are circumstances in which the manufacturer may be worse off, and each retailer better off, as more retailers reveal their information to the manufacturer. However, when the competition in the end market is sufficiently intense, confidential information sharing will emerge as an equilibrium, that is, both the manufacturer and retailers will have incentives to engage in information sharing with strict confidentiality agreements.
We then compare the three scenarios, which differ in degree of confidentiality. We find that a higher degree of confidentiality harms the manufacturer but benefits the retailers. Therefore, retailers, as information owners, have an incentive to keep the information exchange confidential while the manufacturer, as an information recipient, does not have such an incentive. Furthermore, the whole supply chain benefits from a higher degree of confidentiality. In fact, the equilibrium wholesale price is lower with a higher degree of confidentiality and results in chain-optimal retail prices when all retailers share their information confidentially. Hence, strict confidentiality coordinates the supply chain. This efficiency result is due to the fact that the signaling effect created by confidentiality makes the manufacturer's demand more elastic with respect to the wholesale price.
We also examine the effects of information sharing and confidentiality on inventory-related costs when the manufacturer has a make-to-stock option. We show that the make-to-stock option benefits not only the manufacturer but also the retailers. The inventory-related cost is proportional to the upstream demand variability which depends on the amount of undisclosed information as well as the strategic reactions of the competing retailers. The upstream demand becomes more variable when downstream competition becomes more intense and becomes less variable when more retailers share their information. Finally, we also show that confidentiality of information sharing does not affect the manufacturer's inventory related costs.
The plan for this article is as follows. Section 2 specifies the model and its information structure. Section 3 solves the three stage game for each scenario, compares the firms' payoffs across the scenarios and demonstrates the impact of confidentiality. Section 4 considers the manufacturer's making-to-stock capability and incorporates inventory costs into the model. Concluding remarks are in Section 5.
The Model
In a two-echelon supply chain of one manufacturer and n retailers, the manufacturer provides a common base product at a wholesale price of P per unit and the retailers further process it to make similar but nonidentical products through different processes of customization. For convenience, we refer to the manufacturer as she and a retailer as he. All firms are risk neutral. We use N = {1, 2, ..., n} to denote the set of retailers and refer to retailer i's product as product i, i ∈ N . The retailers are symmetric and engage in a Bertrand competition in the end market for which the demand function is given by
where q i is the realized demand for product i, p i is the retail price set by retailer i, and θ is a random variable representing demand uncertainty, E[θ] = 0 and V ar[θ] = σ 2 . Products are assumed to be (imperfect) substitutes and so γ > 0. A larger γ indicates a higher degree of substitution and greater intensity of competition. Note that the total demand P n i=1 q i = na+nθ − P n i=1 p i does not depend on γ directly. The retailers incur a constant and identical marginal cost, on top of P , for customization and retailing, which we normalize to zero without loss of generality. The manufacturer incurs a constant marginal production cost c.
Information Structure
Each retailer i observes a private signal Y i about θ and may choose to share it with other firms.
The joint probability distribution of (θ, Y 1 , ..., Y n ), which is common knowledge, satisfies the following Li (1985) , conditions (C1-C3) imply that
It can be shown that
Three Stage Game
We study a three stage game for which the sequence of events and decisions are as follows:
1. Each retailer commits whether or not to disclose his information. After that, retailer i observes a signal Y i and, if he is a participating retailer, Y i is made known to other firms according to the specified disclosure scenario.
2. The manufacturer sets a wholesale price P .
3. Upon learning P , each retailer chooses a retail price p i . Finally, demand is realized and production is completed to meet the demand.
We denote by K, |K| = k, the set of retailers who make commitment in the first stage to reveal their information, and by Y K , (Y l ) l∈K the set of disclosed signals.
Analysis of The Game
The table below summarizes the information available to the manufacturer or a retailer at the time of making her or his price decision in different disclosure scenarios.
Scenario Manufacturer Participating retailer
In Scenario 3, although shared information Y K is directly available only to the manufacturer, the retailers can infer it (or part of it) from the wholesale price, which is a function of Y K . Similarly, in Scenario 2, the shared information is directly available only to the manufacturer and participating retailers, but the nonparticipating retailers can infer it from the wholesale price.
We solve the game by backward induction, separately for each disclosure scenario.
To analyze retailers' pricing decisions in the third stage of the game, we find it easier to work with the retail margin, w i , p i − P , rather than with p i directly. Using p i = P + w i , we can rewrite the demand function for retailer i as
and can express the total demand D as
Scenario S0 -Disclosure to Retailers Only
In the third stage, knowing the disclosed information Y K , (Y l ) l∈K , and the wholesale price P , retailer i chooses w i to maximize
The first order condition (FOC) for a Nash equilibrium is
The unique solution to the FOC is given by
where
It is straightforward to verify that (2)-(3) satisfies the FOC. Proof for the uniqueness is in Appendix A.
Note that 0 < B k < 1 and B k is decreasing in k, i.e., as the common pool gets larger, a nonparticipating retailer will weigh more heavily on the shared information and less on his own information in his pricing decision. It can be shown that for all i ∈ N \K,
That is, conditional on the shared information, the expected retail prices are the same for all retailers.
We see from the FOC that at equilibrium the retailer's conditional expected profit is given by
In the second stage, the manufacturer's expected demand is
To maximize her profit (P − c)
, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price to
and earns an expected profit of
and the superscript in Π
M denotes the information sharing scenario. Substitute P = P * into (2) and (3), we get
and we calculate retailers' ex ante payoffs by
We use Π 
. . , n−1, a retailer not disclosing information achieves a higher profit than one disclosing information; (b) Π (0)
. . , n − 1, a retailer always becomes better off by disclosing his information; and (c) Π
. . , n − 1, a retailer, given his own disclosure decision, always benefits as the information pool becomes larger.
The proof is in Appendix B. Therefore, each retailer benefits from knowing other retailers' information and from letting other retailers know his information. If we consider the individual incentives for information sharing, then all retailers will share their information in Scenario 0. This result is well known but we include it here for ease of subsequent exposition. Vives (1984) shows the same result for information sharing between duopolists.
Scenario 1 -Disclosure to All Firms
Competition between retailers in the third stage remains unchanged and their equilibrium decisions are still given by (2) and (3).
In the second stage, the expected demand for the manufacturer, conditional on Y K , is
To maximize (P − c)
and achieves a conditional expected profit of
The retail margins at equilibrium are obtained by substituting P = P * into (2)- (3),
The retailers' conditional expected profits are given by
we get the firms' ex ante payoffs
where the superscripts denote the scenario, δ M and δ R are defined in (5) and (6), respectively, and
R (k) denotes the payoff of a participating retailer andΠ
R (k) that of a nonparticipating retailer. Note that the payoff of each firm in Scenarios 0 or 1 is expressed as the sum of two terms, a deterministic (a − c) 2 term and a σ 2 term. The first term, the (a − c) 2 term, is exactly the same in both scenarios and is independent of the information sharing arrangement K. The second term, the σ 2 term, measures the informational gains and depends on the information sharing scenario which determines the information available to each firm. Furthermore, the payoff to a nonparticipating retailer,Π
(1) R (k), has a second σ 2 term (with B k ) which is the gain due to his undisclosed private information and is the same regardless whether the manufacturer is informed or not (Scenario 1 or 0). Also note that this term is decreasing in k, i.e., the private information gain to a nonparticipating retailer is decreasing when more retailers share their information.
Appendix C shows the following result which summarizes the incentives for information sharing in Scenario 1.
. . , n − 1, the manufacturer is always better off as more retailers disclose their information; (b) Π (1)
R (k) for k = 0, . . . , n − 1, each retailer is always worse off by disclosing his information.
Thus, no retailer has an incentive to share his information in Scenario 1. In other words, under no circumstances will a retailer publicly disclose his information. While a retailer improves his payoff by letting other retailers know his information (as in Scenario 0), he suffers a loss by revealing the information to the manufacturer. The manufacturer takes advantage of better information about demand, adjusts the wholesale price accordingly, and seeks better profit, and that hurts the retailer, so much so that his expected payoff suffers a net loss.
Scenario 3 -Disclosure to Manufacturer Only
In this scenario, K is the set of retailers who disclose their signals to the manufacturer. The manufacturer uses Y K = (Y l ) l∈K in deciding a wholesale price P . Although a retailer cannot observe Y K (or all of it) directly, he will try to infer it from P . How he infers information from P depends on his belief as to the functional form of P (Y K ). We restrict the search for equilibrium to the subspace where P (Y K ) is linear in E[θ|Y K ]; namely, P is related to Y K only through a linear relationship with
Equilibrium is then found through the steps described below.
Each retailer conjectures (correctly in equilibrium) that the wholesale pricing policy takes the form
for some constants α and β. Each retailer forms expectations on the uncertain demand by inverting the manufacturer's wholesale price function, taking (P − α)/β to be equal to E[θ|Y K ]. Furthermore, he acts on his belief by substituting (P − α)/β for E[θ|Y K ] in his pricing decision (2) or (3). Specifically, if exactly one retailer shares information, K = {l}, the retail margins are
if two or more retailers share information, |K| = k ≥ 2, the retail margins are
From these we derive
, the conditional expected demand for the manufacturer as a function of P , and then we find the wholesale price P * that maximizes (P − c)
where α 0 and β 0 are functions of α and β. The wholesale pricing function P = α + βE[θ|Y K ] is an equilibrium policy if and only if the retailers' conjecture is fulfilled, that is, α 0 = α, and β 0 = β.
Solving these two equations we get (α, β) = (α * , β * ). The wholesale price P = α * + β * E[θ|Y K ] is an equilibrium in the following sense. As long as all retailers believe that the wholesale price will be set
optimal for the manufacturer to set the wholesale price to α * + β
In Appendix D, we solve for (α * , β * ) and show that the equilibrium wholesale price equals
Note that
k (a − c). Unlike in Scenario 1, the expected equilibrium wholesale price is no longer independent of information sharing arrangement K when information is shared confidentially.
Since B k is decreasing in k, it is easy to see that
k is strictly decreasing in k.
It follows directly from the lemma that
Proposition 3 The expected wholesale price is decreasing in k, that is, the manufacturer lowers the wholesale price on average when more retailers disclose their information confidentially.
When we compare P (3) (Y K ) in (12) with P (1) (Y) in (7), we see that, given any K, the equilibrium wholesale price in Scenario 3 is strictly lower than that in Scenario 1 except for the trivial case of no information sharing. This is because each retailer believes that the wholesale price P is positively correlated with E[θ|Y K ]. If the manufacturer raises her wholesale price P , retailers would infer a higher E[θ|Y K ] and hence set higher profit margins (see the (P − α)/β term in (9), (10) and (11)).
This would reduce the total demand for the manufacturer, prompting her to set a lower wholesale price in equilibrium.
We show in Appendix D that the firms' ex ante payoffs in the first stage are as follows:
, and
The payoff of each firm is again expressed as the sum of two terms, a deterministic (a−c) 2 term and a σ 2 term. Now, however, the deterministic term is no longer independent of information sharing. Note that the second σ 2 term (with B k ) inΠ
R (k) remains the same as that in Scenario 0 or 1, thus the gain from private information to a nonparticipating retailer is independent of information confidentiality.
Lemma 2 (a) δ The proof is in Appendix E. Therefore, as more retailers transmit their information to the manufacturer, the deterministic term in the expected profit functions becomes smaller for the manufacturer but greater for all retailers. Now we address the question whether individual firms will engage in confidential information sharing. When information is disclosed publically, we only need to consider the information owners' incentives: information sharing is an equilibrium as long as each owner has incentives to disclose its information. However, when we study confidential information sharing, we must also consider the incentives for the recipients of information. Because information sharing arrangements we are now considering have a confidentiality agreement attached to them, information exchange will not take place unless both the owner (retailer) and the recipient (manufacturer) sign on to the confidentiality agreement. In fact, it can be shown that, when both σ and s is sufficiently small, the manufacturer becomes worse off by receiving confidential information while retailers benefit by disclosing it.
The next proposition (proved in Appendix F) gives a necessary condition under which each retailer and the manufacturer will have incentives to sign a confidentiality agreement. Recall that the parameter γ is an indicator of competition intensity. We show that when retailer competition is sufficiently intense, confidential information sharing will be an equilibrium, namely, each retailer is better off by disclosing his information to the manufacturer (given that all other retailers have done so) and the manufacturer is better off by receiving information from retailers. .
Proposition 4 When
γ is sufficiently large, Π (3)M (k + 1) > Π (3) M (k) for k = 0, . . . , n − 1, Π (3) R (k + 1) <Π (3) R (k) for k < n − 1, and Π (3) R (n) >Π
Scenario 2 -Disclosure to Manufacturer and Participating Retailers
Nonparticipating retailers conjecture that
The retailers' responses are
It can be shown that the equilibrium wholesale price is
It is easy to see that β
Thus, the expected wholesale price is the highest when no or all information is shared. In fact, when all retailers participate in information sharing, Scenario 2 is reduced to Scenario 1 where all information is made public to all firms. Also note that β The firms' ex ante payoffs are:
, and δ
We omit formal proofs which are very similar to those for Scenario 3 except that now only nonparticipating retailers have to infer the disclosed information. It is easy to see that δ (2)
That is, the deterministic term for the manufacturer (retailers) is the greatest (smallest) when no or all information is shared.
Confidentiality and The Supply Chain Profit
Confidentiality in information sharing implies that only the designated party or parties, and no one else, will receive the information directly. 
That is, with a higher degree of confidentiality, the manufacturer becomes worse off while the retailers better off. Therefore, the manufacturer has an incentive to break confidentiality while each participating retailer has an incentive to keep it. To ensure confidentiality, a retailer can sign a binding confidentiality agreement with the manufacturer. From Proposition 4, such agreements of sharing information confidentially can be reached when retail competition is sufficiently intense. In other cases, the manufacturer must be compensated for keeping confidentiality and that is possible only if confidentiality improves the total supply chain profit.
We now examine the effects of confidentiality on the profitability of the whole supply chain. Suppose Y K is known to the manufacturer and all retailers. Denote by Π(P, Y K ) the expected total supply chain profit conditional on Y K for any given wholesale price P . As Y K is known to all retailers, their equilibrium margins in response to a given P are the same as in Scenario 1 and are given by (2) and (3). The manufacturer's expected profit equals
The retailers' expected profits conditional on Y K are given by
2 for i ∈ K, and
where the second term in the last equality is independent of P . It then follows that
Π(·, Y K ) is quadratic and strictly concave. Let P I (Y K ) = arg max P Π(P, Y K ) be the wholesale price that maximizes the total supply chain profit and Π I (Y K ) = max P Π(P, Y K ) the maximum supply chain profit that can be achieved by coordinating the wholesale price. It can be easily shown that
It is easy to show that
Therefore,
That is, for any K ⊆ N , a higher degree of confidentiality in vertical information sharing results in a lower equilibrium wholesale price, closer to P I (Y K ). And, when above P I (Y K ), a lower equilibrium wholesale price implies a more profitable supply chain.
To be more precise, we denote by Π (m) (Y K ) the expected total equilibrium supply chain profit conditional on the disclosed information Y K in Scenario m, m = 1, 2, 3, and observe that the equilibrium supply chain profit can be obtained by substituting the equilibrium wholesale price P (·) (Y K ) into the supply chain profit function defined in (16), i.e.,
This obviously holds for Scenario 1. It also holds for Scenario 2 and 3 because at the equilibrium wholesale price
i.e., the retailers' expectations are fulfilled at equilibrium and the disclosed information is correctly anticipated. By Proposition 6 and the strict concavity of Π(·, Y K ), we have
, almost surely with respect to Y K .
Propositions 6 and 7 indicate that, for any given K ⊆ N , a higher degree of confidentiality results in a lower wholesale price and a higher expected supply chain profit for almost every realization of the disclosed information Y K . Therefore, the confidential information sharing and the concomitant information asymmetry improve the supply chain efficiency 2 . Most strikingly, when all retailers share their information with the manufacturer and the shared information is kept strictly confidential,
, the confidentiality perfectly aligns the manufacturer's self-interest with that of the entire supply chain.
The result is actually even stronger. Suppose a central planner owns the supply chain and knows all the demand information Y N , and she proceeds to set retail prices so as to maximize the supply chain's expected profit conditional on Y N . It can be shown that the central planner would optimally set each retail price to
This is exactly the equilibrium retail price in Scenario 3 at the equilibrium wholesale price when k = n because by (10) the equilibrium retail price equals
Hence, with strict confidentiality in information sharing, the decentralized supply chain implements the centralized solution, i.e., the monopoly/Bertrand-oligopoly supply chain is efficient as far as the totality of the supply chain is concerned.
Proposition 8 When all retailers share their information with the manufacturer, strict confidentiality
coordinates the supply chain.
Finally, we would like to mention that in the absence of confidentiality, the supply chain may achieve a lower total profit with vertical information sharing (Scenario 1) than with horizontal information sharing (Scenario 0) or no information sharing. Hence, lack of confidentiality destroys the incentives for otherwise beneficial supply chain information sharing.
Make-to-Stock Manufacturer
So far in our analysis we have left out one of the most important gains from information sharing, the reduced inventory costs of leftovers and shortages. One would expect that incorporating these costs would provide increased incentives for firms in a supply chain to share information. To address these incentives, we assume that the manufacturer can produce an initial quantity of Q units before observing the true demand (make to stock) at a marginal cost c o that is lower than the marginal cost of making to order after demand is realized, c. In any of the scenarios, S1, S2 or S3, the sequence of decisions and events is as follows:
1. Each retailer commits whether or not to disclose his information. After that, retailer i observes a signal Y i and, if he is a participating retailer, transmits Y i to the information depository.
2. The manufacturer sets a wholesale price P and makes an initial production amount Q.
3. Upon learning P , each retailer chooses a retail price p i . Finally, demand is realized and additional production, if needed, is completed to meet the demand.
Again this is a three stage game. The difference now is that the manufacturer has the option of making to stock. After receiving the shared information, if any, she has an opportunity to produce an initial lot Q at the same time she selects a wholesale price P . We assume that the manufacturer is obliged to meet the demand from the retailers. This is a reasonable assumption when the manufacturer wants to maintain her reputation and resolves to always satisfy downstream orders. If D = P n i=1 q i > Q, i.e., the sales exceeds the initial production, then D − Q additional units are made at a cost of c per unit, c > c o . We may think that the costs of production given a long lead-time (starting before orders are received) are lower than the costs of fast response to urgent demand (handling shortages after the orders are observed), thus a second lot produced using overtime or subcontracting incurs a higher cost.
If D < Q, the leftover Q − D is sold at the salvage value of v per unit, v < c o . In a sense Q can be viewed as the capacity set by the manufacturer and c o − v as the opportunity cost associated with each unit of idle capacity. If the manufacturer does not use the make-to-stock option, then Q ≡ 0 and we return to the make-to-order setting as before with unit production cost c.
In the third stage, the retailers' margin decisions w * i (P ) in response to an announced wholesale price P is the same as before, (2)- (3) in Scenario 1, (8)- (9) or (10)- (11) in Scenario 3, and (13)- (14) in Scenario 2. The retailers are not concerned with Q, knowing that their orders will be filled.
In the second stage, with a given information sharing arrangement, the manufacturer chooses her strategy, P (Y K ) and Q (Y K ). Anticipating the retailers' margin decisions w * i (P ), the manufacturer faces demand
which does not depend on the initial production decision Q. The manufacturer's expected profit conditional on her information Y K , as a function of P and Q, can be written as
The first term, independent of Q, is the expected profit at regular marginal production cost, and the second term is the inventory cost accounting for possible over-production and expedition.
Knowing w * i (P ), the manufacturer chooses P and Q to maximize her expected profit. The maximization can be done in two logical steps,
Since (P − c o )E[D|Y K ] does not depend on Q, the inner maximization is equivalent to minimizing the inventory cost for a given P ,
This is a newsboy problem for which the overage cost is c o − v and the underage cost c − c o . To solve (19), note that in any given scenario, S1, S2 or S3, and for any given P , we can write the residual demand, the difference between the demand realization and its expected value, as
We see thatD is independent of the choice of P ; in other words, D depends on P only via its conditional
be the solution to a newsboy problem with the residual demand
Then, the solution to (19) is given by
Since D − Q =D −Q, the two newsboy problems have the same optimal value (the minimum inventory cost),
and this optimal value for problem (19) does not change with the choice of P . Therefore, the optimal wholesale price in the solution to (18) can be found by ignoring the inventory cost,
The right-hand side is precisely the optimization problem that the manufacturer solves in earlier sections except that c is now replaced by c o .
Hence, the equilibrium wholesale price P * in the case of make-to-stock manufacturer is the same as in the make-to-order case except that we need to replace c with c o ,
As a consequence, the retailers' ex ante payoffs, Π R (k) andΠ R (k), remain the same as before except replacing c with c o . Note that P * is now lower than before since c o < c, so retailers also benefit from the manufacturer's make-to-stock option. Also note that P * does not depend on v and c; in particular, if there is an increase in the second-batch production cost c, it is optimal for the manufacturer not to pass it on to the retailers.
To derive the inventory cost V k explicitly, we impose a more restrictive information structure.
Normal Conjugate Information Structure
We assume that the demand signals, Y i , i ∈ N , are independent draws from a normal distribution with an unknown mean θ and a known variance and that θ itself is a priori normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ 2 . In other words, {Y i , i ∈ N } and θ form a normally distributed conjugate pair (DeGroot 1986, Chapter 6).
From (20), the variance of D conditional on Y K for any given P equals
In Appendix G we show that, assuming the normal conjugate information structure,
Furthermore, given P and Y K , D is normally distributed.
It is well-known in the inventory literature that the inventory cost of a newsboy problem for a normal distributed demand with variance σ 2 k equals
where z is the standard normal random variable with zero mean and unit variance and z * is defined by the tail probability,
It is easy to show that G is increasing in c and decreasing in v. We can think of G as the inventory cost rate for each unit of standard deviation of θ.
The manufacturer's payoff in the first stage is given by
where the first term is the payoff as before except using c o for c.
The inventory costs are the same in the three scenarios, S1, S2 and S3.
Proposition 9 Inventory costs are not affected by confidentiality of vertical information sharing.
For a given k, the inventory cost is linear in the standard deviation σ of the demand shock θ while the first term in Π (·) M (k) above is quadratic in σ, thus the manufacturer's payoff is decreasing in σ for small σ. This differs from the standard result in the oligopoly information literature without inventory consideration where the equilibrium profit is often increasing in the variance of the demand shock. This is because a higher variance of the demand shock increases the value of information but also increases the inventory cost.
Propositions 5-8 of the last section regarding confidentiality still holds, i.e., the manufacturer becomes worse off while the retailers become better off with a higher degree of confidentiality, confidentiality improves supply chain profitability, etc.
When all retailers share information, the demand variance is σ 2 n = n 2 sσ 2 n+s , which is not dependent on γ. For k < n, σ 2 k changes with γ. In Appendix H we show the following result.
Proposition 10 For k < n, σ 2 k is increasing in γ, that is, the upstream demand becomes more variable as the downstream competition becomes more intense.
A question arises as to whether the manufacturer will face less demand uncertainty, and thus incurs lower inventory costs, as she receives information from more retailers. Straightforward comparison shows that Proposition 11 σ 2 n < σ 2 0 .
Furthermore, extensive numerical tests suggest that σ 2 k+1 < σ 2 k for all k, although we have come up short of a rigorous proof. To understand where the possible ambiguity comes from, we take a closer look at the expression of upstream demand variance (21). From the manufacturer's viewpoint, there are two sources of uncertainty: the market size, θ, and undisclosed retailers' market intelligence, P i∈N \K Y i (which leads to uncertainty in retail prices). Obviously, both V ar
are decreasing in k. The coefficient B k is the weight the retailers who do not share information put on their own, undisclosed information to determine retail prices. In view of (21), we can think of B k as a "multiplier" that translates the uncertainty, P i∈N\K Y i , into the retail price variability-this multiplier becomes smaller when k increases. However, the covariance between market size uncertainty and retail price uncertainty also becomes smaller when k increases. This effect tends to increase the variability of upstream demand as k increases since retail prices are negatively correlated with the demand. Therefore, in the presence of downstream competition, the upstream demand variability depends not only on how much information the upstream firm has but also on the downstream firms' strategic reaction to information sharing.
Concluding Remarks
It is well known that the total supply chain profit suffers from "double-marginalization": when each player maximizes its own profit, the monopolistic manufacturer will charge a wholesale price that is higher than the chain-optimal. This is true for single or multiple, Bertrand or Cournot retailers.
We have shown in this paper that confidentiality alleviates the problem when retailers are Bertrand oligopolists. The central role of confidential vertical information sharing is to change information allocation in a supply chain from that of localized and dispersed information residing in retailers to that in which information is centralized at the manufacturer. The wholesale price therefore aggregates the information and retailers use it to form their rational expectations on the market condition. As a consequence, for reasons we explain below, the equilibrium wholesale price is lower with a higher degree of confidentiality and is chain-optimal when all retailers' information is disclosed confidentially.
In short, confidentiality improves the supply chain efficiency.
In a perfectly competitive market, rational expectations under asymmetric information improve the market efficiency (see Grossman 1981 , and references therein). We have shown that rational expectations under asymmetric information created by confidential information sharing also improve the efficiency of a monopoly/oligopoly supply chain. The question is: How general is this result?
Without confidentiality, the wholesale price is simply a unit cost to retailers and a unit revenue to the manufacturer. In the presence of confidentiality, the wholesale price P plays an additional role of signaling demand information because the retailers expect it to be positively correlated with the aggregate demand information. A higher (lower) P signals to retailers a more (less) favorable market condition, which in turn induces them to set higher (lower) retail margins. Therefore, the signaling effect of an increase in wholesale price results in higher retail prices and, consequently, lower retail quantities. This implies that demand for the manufacturer becomes more elastic to the wholesale price. It is this added price elasticity for the manufacturer, when information is shared confidentially, that prompts her to set a lower P , improving the supply chain efficiency.
This intuitive argument seems to point to a condition under which confidentiality improves the supply chain efficiency: that the signaling effect of an increase in the wholesale price results in a decrease in retail quantities. We believe that our efficiency result can be extended, by exploring this condition, to more general situations, such as more general demand functions, heterogeneous information (different signal precision for different retailers), convex production cost functions, uncertainty in the slope of the demand function, etc.
On the other hand, the efficiency result does not hold if the aforementioned condition fails. For example, we can show that, if the retailers are Cournot oligopolists, confidentiality makes the wholesale price higher and decreases the supply chain efficiency. Intuitively, it is the violation of the above condition that reverses the result. In this case, the signaling effect of an increase in the wholesale price results in an increase in retail quantities, because a higher P signals to retailers a more favorable market condition, which in turn induces them to choose greater quantities. This makes the demand for the manufacturer less elastic to the wholesale price and prompts her to set a higher P .
It is also well known that information is a substitute for inventory. We incorporate the maketo-stock option into our model. This allows us to reexamine the relationship between information and inventory in the presence of competition. This feature captures the gain from vertical information sharing to the manufacturer, as well as the supply chain as a whole, due to reduced leftover and shortage costs. The make-to-stock option also benefits the retailers because it lowers the wholesale price. We demonstrate how the variability of upstream demand relates to the amount of undisclosed information, to the downstream competition, and to the strategic reaction of the retailers. Furthermore, while higher intensity of downstream competition increases the average demand facing the manufacturer, it also increases the demand variability and thus her inventory related costs. This may result in a net loss to the manufacturer or even the supply chain as a whole. Finally, we also show that confidentiality of information sharing does not affect the manufacturer's inventory related cost.
We have assumed that the manufacturer is obliged to satisfy retailers' orders and hence bears all inventory related costs. While this assumption enables us to sequentially optimize the manufacturer's initial production quantity and wholesale price decisions, it is a limitation of our model. It will be an interesting challenge to incorporate inventory policies at the retailer level and let the inventory costs be shared by both upstream and downstream firms. (2)- (3) The FOC can be written as 2(1 + γ)w *
Suppose there are two solutions and let u i be the difference of the two. We have 2(1 + γ)u i = γ n−1
Taking expectation of both sides conditional on u i , we get 2(1 + γ)u i = γ n−1
Fix any l ∈ N , we rewrite the last set of equations as
and
Taking expectation of the last equality conditional on u l , we get
Summing both sides over all i 6 = l, we have
or equivalently,
This, together with (22), implies that u l = 0, a.s.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Part (a) is obvious. For Part (b), we express Π (0)
It is straightforward to verify B k (k + 1 + s) < 1 and that completes (b). Part (c) follows from (a) and (b) sincē
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Parts (a) is obvious. For Part (b), we express Π
(1)
It is straightforward to verify B k (k + 1 + s) > 1 2 and that completes the proof.
D. Equilibrium Wholesale Price and Ex Ante Payoffs in Scenario 3
We consider three cases separately, K = ∅, |K| = 1, or |K| > 1.
No retailer sharing information. This is the same as K = ∅ in Scenario 1.
Exactly one retailer sharing information. Suppose K = {l}. Other retailers i 6 = l conjecture that
By rearranging terms, the above can be expressed as
For P * = α + βE[θ|Y l ] to be an equilibrium, we must have
Solving these, we get
1 , c + β
1 (a − c).
Therefore, the equilibrium wholesale price is
The manufacturer's conditional expected profit at equilibrium equals
At equilibrium the retailers' conjecture, E[θ|Y l ] = (P * − α)/β, is fulfilled and the retail margins are
The retailers' conditional expected profits at equilibrium are given by
Finally, the firms' ex ante payoffs in the first stage are obtained by taking expectation over
More than one retailer sharing information. With k > 1, all retailers conjecture that
, the conditional expected demand for the manufacturer, as
For P * = α + βE[θ|Y K ] to be an equilibrium, we must have
At equilibrium, the retailers' conjecture, E[θ|Y K ] = (P * − α)/β, is fulfilled and the retail margins are
The retailers' conditional expected profits at equilibrium are given by E[π i |Y i , Y K ] = (1 + γ)(w * i ) 2 , i.e.,
Finally, the firms' ex ante payoffs in the first stage are obtained by taking expectation over (Y i , Y K ).
E. Proof of Lemma 2
Since B k is decreasing in k, so is (n − k)B k , we have Claim 1: n − (n − k)B k is increasing in k.
The claim directly implies that δ For k = 1, we have from Claim 1 that n − (n − 2)B 2 > n − (n − 1)B 1 > (n − 1)(1 − B 1 ), thus δ 
F. Proof of Proposition 4
As γ goes to infinity, δ We note that, as γ goes to infinity, γδ .
It then follows that, as γ goes to infinity, γ[Π It is easy to check that the above equals to
which is negative for k < n− 1. Thus, when γ is large, Π
R (k +1) <Π
R (k) for k < n− 1. Hence, no information sharing is an equilibrium and k retailers sharing information is not an equilibrium for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1.
Next we show that, when γ is large, Π It is easy to verify that
R (n − 1) = 1 4n(1 + γ) 2 (n + s) − 1 16n 2 (1 + γ) 3 (n + s) 2 = δ Lastly, to show Pareto dominance, we have
R (0) = δ since the inequality implies both 4(n−1)s 2 −4s−3n > 0 and 2ns−2s−n > 0.
We note that
for all n ≥ 2.
G. Computation of Variance of the Upstream Demand
Let X 1 = P j∈K Y j and X 2 = nθ − B k 2+γ P i∈N \K Y i . It can be shown that the conditional distribution of X 2 given (Y j ) j∈K depends on (Y j ) j∈K only through the sum P j∈K Y j and thus is identical to the conditional distribution of X 2 given X 1 = P j∈K Y j . Therefore,
We quote a statistics result from Section 5.12, DeGroot (1986): If X 1 and X 2 have a bivariate normal distribution, and the coefficient of correlation between X 1 and X 2 equals ρ X 1 ,X 2 , then
Now we have
Substituting these into the expression for V ar[X 2 |X 1 ], we get
H. Proof of Proposition 10
We can write σ 2 k as f (y)sσ 2 where y = B k 2 + γ and
It is easy to verify that y is decreasing in γ and y < n n+s . It then follows that df dy = 2(n − k)(n + s) k + s µ y − n n + s ¶ < 0, and f (y) is decreasing in y. Hence, σ 2 k is increasing in γ.
